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JURISPRUDENCE
GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT
Paradoxically, it is no virtue to be virtuous in America today. Or-
ganized crime reaches its tentacles into every major city in the nation,
and into many of the smaller towns. Gamblers are protected by corrupt
politicians, and bribery, or "small gifts," to influential men in Washing-
ton has become an everyday affair. Juvenile delinquency is at an all-
time high. It would be surprising, indeed, if the sexual standards of the
country were left untouched by this general degeneration. The recent
Kinsey Report did its best to assure us that male sexual deviates were
in such a majority that they constitute the norm. Two separate and in-
dependent surveys' show that 68% of the married women in the United
States have had some pre-marital sexual experience. Of necessity this
general attitude has seriously affected the institution of marriage.
The family is the basic unit of our social life, but so rent and torn has
it become in recent years that its very existence is threatened. Divorce
has become easy, and, therefore, frequently indulged in. In the calen-
dar year 1948, no less than 94,579 marriages were dissolved in nineteen
states alone. 2 In some states, notably Florida, Arkansas, and Nevada,
divorce has become a leading industry. Easy divorces are facilitated by
negligible residence requirements,3 and by tolerant and kindly judges.
-Terman, L.M., Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness, 1938, and Sex
Habits of: European Women vs. American Women, March, 1951. The rapid
rate at which morals in this respect have deteriorated is illustrated by Dr. Ter-
man. According to his survey, of the women who were married before 1912,
only 12% had pre-marital sexual experience; of the women who married
during and immediately after World War I, 26% were non-virgins at the
time of marriage; this percentage increased to 49% for those women who
married in the 1922-1931 period; and of the women who married between
1932 and 1937, 68% had sexual intercourse prior to marriage. One can only
speculate on the effect that World War II has had on these figures. The latest
survey would tend to show that the figure is still 68%, but apparently this
percentage represents all women tested, and the percentage for the 1937-1950
period would have to be considerably greater to counterbalance the smaller
percent for earlier years.
2 The nineteen states indicated, together with the marriages dissolved by di-
vorce or annulment are as follows: Alabama, 9,699; Connecticut, 2,847;
Delaware, 415; Florida, 18,015; Idaho, 3,190; Iowa, 5,609; Maryland, 5,999;
Minnesota, 4,678; Mississippi, 6,697; Montana, 2,090; Nebraska, 2,752; New
Hampshire, 1,260; Oregon, 6,405; South Dakota, 1,030; Tennessee, 8,292;
Utah, 2,199; Virginia, 7,081; Wisconsin, 5,075; and Wyoming, 1,246. These
statistics are taken from "Divorce and Annulment Statistics: Specified States,
1948," Vital Statistics-Special Reports, Vol. 35, No. 12, National Office of
Vital Statistics, Federal Security Agency, August 7, 1950, p. 165.
3 Nevada acquires jurisdiction after only six weeks residence by the party seek-
ing the divorce; Wyoming requires only 60 days residence; While Florida
acquires jurisdiction after 90 days. Some states have no residence require-
ments where grounds for divorce fall within specified limits, usually that
the parties were residents at the time the grounds arose, and that the grounds
arose within the state. For examples of this, see Minn. Stat. (1945) sec.
518.01; Wis. Stat. (1949) sec. 247.06.
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Easy divorces are not within the grasp of everyone however. Un-
til 1949, South Carolina granted no divorces.4 The State of New York
grants a divorce only on the grounds of adultery. Other states have
provisions which, while not necessarily making divorce difficult, make
it at least inconvenient. 5 For those who, for financial, health, or other
reasons, cannot travel to other jurisdictions to obtain their divorces, a
different method has been used to secure the dissolution of their mar-
riages. This is dissolution by annulment.
However little can be said for the severance of the marriage tie by
divorce, there can be little doubt but that annulment, properly under-
stood and properly applied, is a legitimate and moral method of ending
a marital relationship. Whereas a decree of divorce has for its object
the termination of a valid marriage, for some cause arising after the
celebration of that marriage, a decree of annulment is merely a judicial
declaration that the marriage has been void and of no force from its
inception, by reason of some cause existing prior to or concurrent
with the marriage ceremony.
In civil law, however, this simple concept has been sadly con-
fused by three factors. The first is that anomaly, the voidable mar-
riage. Logically it would seem that the outcome of every marriage cere-
mony6 must be either a valid marriage, because all of the prerequisites
to a valid marriage are present, or an invalid or void marriage, because
one or more of the prerequisites is absent. This, however, is not the
case. By defining marriage as nothing more than a civil contract, the
state has let in contractual concepts that have no place in the sacra-
mental, or even the purely natural, union of man and woman. Thus,
most states have statutes prohibiting the marriage of minors below
specified ages. But contrary to the normal expectation, an attempted
marriage by such a minor does not result in a void marriage, but in a
voidable one. For it is elementary law that contracts between minors
are voidable by either party,7 and contracts between a minor and an
adult are voidable by the minor. Until avoidance, all such contracts are
valid. By the same token, marriages entered into by force or fraud are
voidable, since the law for contracts in general is such.8 We have, there-
fore, a betwixt and between status of marriage--one which was entered
4 On April 15, 1949, Governor J. Strom Thurmond signed into law a bill allow-
ing divorce on the grounds of adultery, desertion for a period of one year,
physical cruelty, or habitual drunkenness.
5 For example, Massachusetts has a residence requirement of three years where
both parties were residents at the time of marriage, and five years in all other
cases.
6 The terms "ceremony" and "celebrattion," as everywhere used in this article,
are used to include common law marriages in those states which recognize
them.
Restatement of Contracts, sec. 431, comment b (1933).8 Restatement of Contracts, sec. 467 (1) (1933).
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into invalidly, but which is valid until declared void on the whim of the
"innocent" party.
A second element of confusion rests on the fact that, because of
jurisdictional differences9 and because of the concept of the voidable
marriage, a court may have the authority to declare a conjugal union
void only from the date of the decree."0 But this is nothing more than
divorce ! If a marriage is void, then it is void because it was never valid-
ly contracted. And if a marriage is valid, then it does not retroactively
become void. The arbitrary establishment of any later date than the
time of celebration as the effective date of avoidance is sheer nonsense,
for, by definition of terms, such a marriage must be void ab initio.
The grounds for annulment, as laid by the legislatures and inter-
preted by the courts, make up the third and most pernicious factor lend-
ing confusion to this segment of the law. To repeat our earlier state-
ment, since a decree of annulment is granted for a cause which pro-
hibited the celebration of a valid marriage, necessarily all such grounds
must exist antecedently to or concurrently with the celebration of the
marriage. It therefore follows that any grounds arising subsequently are
barren grounds with respect to this decree, irrespective of their char-
acter. Nevertheless, the statistical compilation published by the Nation-
al Office of Vital Statistics"' shows that in the year 1948 annulments
were granted in at least two states for abandonment, conviction of
crime, cruel and inhuman treatment, non-support, and habitual intem-
perance. To call such dissolutions annulments is not, in the idiom of the
day, calling a spade a spade. It is, in fact, not even properly calling it
a shovel. In order to clarify the status of existing state laws, an exam-
ination of those factors which invalidate a marriage would probably
be helpful.
In general, there are three conditions necessary to the establish-
ment of a valid marriage: (1) celebration as prescribed by competent
authority; (2) free consent of the parties; and (3) the absence of any
diriment impediment, i.e., the absence of any factor prescribed by law
as absolutely nullifying the marriage. If any of these three conditions
be not fulfilled, then there is no marriage, and a declaration of nullity
is proper to establish the status of the parties.
The first condition prescribes that that marriage be celebrated in the
manner set down by the authority within whose province it is to regu-
late that marriage. All jurisdictions regulate the celebration of mar-
riages in some manner, prescribing licensing, blood tests, and the like.
And whereas the Catholic Church considers that the solemnization of
9 An example of this situation is found in the case of Dodds v. Pittsburgh,
M. & B. Rys. Co., 107 Pa. Super. 20, 162 A. 468 (1932).
10 Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, sec. 115 (1934).
"I Op. cit., pp. 166-168.
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the marriage of its members, because a divinely instituted sacrament,
is in the hands of the Church rather than in the hands of the State,
still Catholics are bound in conscience to observe these laws because
just and for the common good. Non-observance, while sinful, does not
invalidate the marriage, though at civil law an annulment for an un-
licensed marriage is sometimes granted. However, most states, while
forbidding these marriages, generally recognize their validity. There
is no doubt but what the state, in its discretion, may grant such annul-
ments in all cases where it has the proper governance of the marriage.
State statutes must be individually examined to determine the position
of that jurisdiction in regard to the validity of marriages not sol-
emnized in accordance with the law.
The second condition requires that each party freely give his or her
consent to the marriage contract. 12 It is basic that no one may be forced
into contractual obligations against his will. This is most particularly
true of the marriage contract. For this reason the legislatures have de-
creed that a marriage entered into by reason of fraud, duress, non-age,
insanity, or mistake or joke may be annulled at the suit of the party
under the disability, and sometimes at the suit of the other party. A
lack of consent is implicit in each of these grounds, with the possible
exception of fraud, and it is upon this that their validity exists as
grounds for annulment.
Fraud is now a most popular ground for annulment proceedings.
A marriage based upon a fraudulent representation is considered in
civil law as no marriage at all, simply because consent was given to the
union as represented to the defrauded party, and not to the marriage
as it actually existed. Such a ground as this easily lends itself to abuse.
Consider, for example, a case as reported by Mr. A. E. Hotchner in an
article written for This Week Magazine.
"'Now tell the judge,' one lawyer said, 'why you want an
annulment.'
"'Well,' said his client, a pert young lady of 25 or so, 'when
he was taking me out before we got married, he used to always
tell me how much better off I'd be married to him than work-
ing and living with my parents. He told me no wife of his would
ever have to work. Well, I believed him and we got married. .. '
"'You married him believing you would never have to
work?' the lawyer interjected.
12 "Yet, although matrimony is of its very nature of divine institution, the hu-
man will, too, enters into it and performs a most noble part. For each
individual marriage, inasmuch as it is a conjugal union of a particular man
and woman, arises only from the free consent of each of the spouses; and
this free act of the will, by which each party hands over and accepts those
rights proper to the state of marriage, is so necessary to constitute true mar-
riage that it cannot be supplied by any human power." Pope Pius XI, En-
cyclical, Casti Conmebii, 1941.
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"'I certainly did,' his client answered, 'but soon after he lost
his business and he got a job that didn't pay very well so I took
back my old position. I've been working now for three years.'
"The annulment was granted without further questioning."
13
As is obvious, the element of fraud is only superficially present in
this case, if indeed it exists at all. In consenting to the marriage con-
tract (part of which reads "for better or for worse, for richer or for
poorer"), no person may reserve to himself the right to withdraw if
the rosy dreams of youth fail to materialize. Nor does a promise based
on expectancy constitute a misrepresentation. The ordinary tenets of
contract law, even, will seldom admit of this. In order to obviate this
type of annulment proceeding, some courts have defined fraud much
more strictly. As a result, there are current today two conflicting views
on the adequacy of fraud as grounds for annulment.
Representative of the first view is New York which holds that if
consent to marriage was induced by a misrepresentation, no matter what
that representation may have been, good grounds for annulment are
present.1 4 It was in New York that the annulment reported by Mr.
Hotchner was granted. That annulment, however, was an unauthorized
extension of this rule, for there was no actual misrepresentation pres-
ent there. At the other end of the ladder is the holding of Wisconsin,
which has adopted the position that, although marriage is considered by
the state as a purely civil contract, false representations which would
set aside ordinary civil contracts are not necessarily sufficient to void
the contract of marriage. The Wisconsin view is that the false repre-
sentations must go to the essentials of the marriage contract.15
Thus we have two varying expressions of the law. But which, if
either, of these accords more closely to right reason and good morals?
There is in every marriage contract, as in every purely civil contract,
elements which are substantial and elements whnch are accidental.
Clearly, where a party has been defrauded on a substantial element of
the marriage, it is then void. Thus, where there is error concerning the
person of the defrauding party, the marriage is void. This is most clear-
ly illustrated in the case where there has been a substitution of twins.
For in such a case the consent of the two contracting parties would not
join. For example, A would consent to marry B; but B is not present
to accept A's consent, C does this; however, A's consent never went
3A. E. Hotchner, "The New Annulment Racket," This Week Magazine, Jan-
uary 21, 1951, p. 7.14 "If the plaintiff proves to the satisfaction of the court that, through mis-
representation of some fact, which was an essential element in the giving of
his consent to the contract of marriage and which was of such a nature
as to deceive an ordinarily prudent person, he has been victimized, the court
is empowered to annul the marriage." Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N.Y.
467, 474, 67 N.E. 63, 65, 63 L.R.A. 92, 95, 95 Am. St. Rep. 609, 613 (1903).
'15 Wells v. Talham, 180 Wis. 654, 194 N.W. 36, 33 A.L.R. 27 (1923).
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out to C. Another case of substantial fraud is found where the defraud-
ing party, at the time of the marriage, has no intention of surrender-
ing his or her body to the other party. This marriage would be void
for the reason that the very essence of the marital compact is the right
of the conjugal act.
Where only the accidentals of a marriage are involved, avoidance
is not morally possible. Qualities of the defrauding party such as health,
virginity, wealth, and the like are mere accidents. What then of a man
who has been defrauded into believing before marriage that his spouse
is a virgin, but who finds this to be untrue later? His consent never-
theless goes out to this woman who has lied to him, despite the fact that
it might not have gone out had he been apprised of all of the facts.
The misrepresentation does not rob his act of consenting of its effec-
tiveness.
16
Assuming the correctness of these distinctions, Wisconsin would
seem to have the more technically correct view. As a consequence, the
Wisconsin position attains a most desirable result: the strengthening of
the marriage bond and the maintenance of the family. In applying this
law, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court handed down an un-
fortunate decision in the case of Wells v. Talham." The complaint al-
leged, in that case, that an elderly Roman Catholic entered into a mar-
riage agreement with a Protestant who falsely represented that she was
a widow and had never been divorced. Actually she had been divorced,
and her first husband was still living. She knew it was against the laws
of the Roman Catholic Church for the complainant to marry her under
the circumstances, and knew that he might be excommunicated for so
doing. She further agreed to have a Catholic ceremony performed if
the complainant would first marry her in a Methodist Episcopal cere-
mony. After the Protestant ceremony, the defendant refused to carry
out this promise. The annulment was denied on the ground that the
defendant's misrepresentation did not go to the essence of the marriage
contract, since, civilly, the defendant was free to marry. Logically, the
court was correct in its decision, insofar as this decision was based on
an insistence that the essentials or substance of the marriage be in-
volved, inasmuch as, under American law, the court was bound to
recognize the defendant's divorce. However, what the court neglected
to consider here was the complaint's attitude toward the marriage cere-
mony in which he took part. He did not, would not, and according to
the tenets of his faith, could not, consider the Methodist Episcopal
16 Marriages have been dissolved on these grounds. Cf. Gatto v. Gatto, 79 N.H.
177, 106 A. 493 (1919). The same court refused an annulment on these same
grounds thirteen years later in Heath v. Heath, 85 N.H. 419, 159 A. 418
(1932).
'17 Supra, Note 15.
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ceremony as valid. This was his reason for insisting on a subsequent
Catholic ceremony. Therefore, his consent did not go out to the de-
fendant at that prior ceremony in any greater sense than it would have
at a dress rehearsal of the marriage. And where his consent failed to
go out, no marriage could result. Yet the Wisconsin court left him in
the legal position of being a married man."'
The ground of duress or force is undoubtedly a valid ground for
annulment, since consent to such a marriage is made in fear of bodily
harm. Consent so procured is consent of the lips only, and not of the
mind. It is, therefore, no consent as will result in a binding contract.
Although there are exceptions, the courts are fairly well agreed that
marriages entered into under duress are voidable.'9 There is authority
to the effect that the duress must come from the defendant or at his or
her instigation, 0 but this has little foundation in reason, since force is
force from whatever source it may come. However, if it is shown upon
trial that the duress or force used was slight, there is less justification
for the granting of an annulment. For, where the force is slight or
negligible, the consent was freely given, even though reluctantly.
On the ground that the parties to a marriage contract must be of a
certain age, prescribed by statute, before they are capable of giving
their consent to marriage, all states grant annulments to parties marry-
ing under this age. The ages vary from state to state. Under the com-
mon law this age was 14 for males and 12 for females, and some juris-
dictions still follow this rule. A great many other states have raised the
age limit. In Wisconsin, for example, the male must be 18 and the
female 15 years of age.21 Such marriages are considered voidable,
however, and not void, providing the parties have at least reached the
age of reason, which is considered to be reached at 7 years.2 2 Marriages
below that age are, of course, void. While this attitude may be question-
able on the basis of logic, since a person has either reached an age at
Is The court's further point, made in reference to the defendant's promise to
have a Roman Catholic ceremony performed, that a marriage should not be
annulled on the ground of broken promises, is well taken. New York, on
the other hand, has granted annulments for this reason in Taylor v. Taylor,
181 Misc. 306, 47 N.Y.S. (2d) 401 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Hubner v. Hubner, 64
N.Y.S. (2d) 513 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Vonbiroganis v. Von Brock, 64 N.Y.S. (2d)
885 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; and Cart v. Cart, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 61 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
'9 Cases on this point are collected in 91 A.L.R. 414 (1934).
20 "To be available as a ground for relief it must appear that the duress of the
party asking to be relieved was occasioned by the other contracting party,
or that he knowingly used or availed himself of such duress as a means of
procuring the contract sought to be annulled." Sherman v. Sherman, 20
N.Y.S. 414 (1892).
21 Wis. Stat. sec. 245.02 (1949).
22 "The American jurisdictions have quite generally followed the principle that
marriages where one or both parties are under the age of consent are not
void, but only voidable. Some have done this by express statute; in others
the same result is reached by judicial decision." I Vernier, American Family
Laws (1931), p. 118.
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which he may freely consent to the marriage contract or he has not,
strong policy reasons dictate the state's acceptance of the rule. The im-
petuosity of youth would often lead to tragic results were such mar-
riages declared absolutely valid. And on the other hand, where they
considered absolutely void, there would be many problems concerning
estates and legitimacy that would inevitably lead, in many instances, to
palpable injustice. Whether such policy reasons are sufficent to counten-
ance the invalidating of a marriage freely consented to by parties capa-
ble of consuming it is another question. If we are to take the position,
as we do, that marriage, whether natural or sacramental, is an indis-
soluble union, then certainly these considerations do not warrant the
granting of annulments. But in all cases where the state has the govern-
ance of the marriage tie, it is undoubtedly within its rights in prescrib-
ing such rules as diriment impediments if it deems this advisable. This,
however, would make the marriage void rather than voidable.
There is no question but what persons who are insane or who are
idiots at the time of their marriage are incapable of consenting to the
marriage contract, and no one seriously disputes this. Thus, an annul-
ment is properly granted on the grounds of idiocy or insanity. There
is, however, some question as to the quantum of insanity necessary to
render the giving of consent impossible. The law quite universally
holds that a person may be sane enough to consent to marriage and yet
be insane in all other respects. Judge Pattison, in expounding on this
point in Elfont v. Elfont,23 said:
"The well-settled rule or principle of law, both in this state
and elsewhere, by which we are to be controlled, is that, to ren-
der a marriage invalid because of insanity on the part of one of
the parties to the contract, it must be shown clearly and con-
vincingly that such party was unable to understand the nature
of the contract of marriage and to appreciate the legal conse-
quences naturally deducible therefrom. Every variation from a
normal mental condition is not in itself enough to avoid the mar-
riage contract. The mental defect or derangement must be one
having a direct bearing upon such contract. If the party enter-
ing the marriage relation has sufficient capacity to understand
the nature of the contract and the duties and responsibilities
which it creates, the marriage will be valid. Mere weakness or
imbecility of mind is not sufficient, nor eccentricity or partial
dementia, but it must be such a general mental derangement as
prevents the party from comprehending the nature of the con-
tract of marriage and from giving to it his free and intelligent
consent."24
To the medical profession, on the other hand, a person is either in-
sane or he is not. If he is insane on one subject, this insanity infects
23 161 Md. 458, 157 A. 741 (1932).
24 Ibid., p. 746.
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and affects his whole mental capacity. Partial insanity, then, is a psychic
impossibility. If this view is correct, and we have no reason to doubt it,
then insanity is an absolute bar to marriage. No amount of apparent
lucidity concerning marriage would give a person so afflicted the free-
dom to consent to a marital union. And since, as we have said, the
validity of marriage rests in part on free consent thereto, all such mar-
riages are void. Nevertheless, though the study of the mind is outside
of the field of law, still the courts are justified in slowly accepting the
medical viewpoint, since knowledge of the mind is admittedly incom-
plete.
As to marriage entered into by mistake or joke, such marriages are
void for lack of consent. It seems to us basic that if a person does not
intend to get married when he goes through the ceremony, then he is
not married; or if he does not intend to marry the particular person
with whom he goes through that ceremony, then he is not in fact marry-
ing that person. The jurisdictions hold this viewpoint with great regu-
larity.
The law, with singular uniformity, describes all marriages entered
into under these five disabilities, which we have denominated lack of
consent, as voidable? 5 That is to say, they may, through ratification,
later become valid marriages not subject to annulment proceedings. Or,
if not ratified, they may be declared null and void. Barring both ratifi-
cation and annulment, they remain in that indeterminate stage of noth-
inguess of which we have previously spoken. If not avoided before
death, the law usually presumes ratification and prohibits collateral
attacks on their validity.
Yet the law has some justification for its illogical position. Mar-
riage is a right natural to all men not under a prohibitory disability.
And though Church and State may regulate marriage, they may not
take this natural right away? 6 Therefore it follows that while the
Church and State may demand that all marriages within their jursidic-
tion be performed in accordance with its decrees, and may make all
marriages not so performed illicit, they may not decree such marriages
invalid. Such being the case, any union contracted by mutual consent
of the parties is a valid marriage. In legal parlance this is termed a
common law marriage. Where, therefore, lack of consent prevents the
fruition of a binding marriage at the time of the ceremony, there is
2 There are, of course, exceptions under every point, but an absolute uniform-
ity on any rule of law seems to be a well-recognized impossibility. Even
those laws labeled "uniform" are often altered before being incorporated
into the statutes of those states adopting them.
26 "To take away from man the natural and primeval right of marriage, to
circumscribe in any way the principal ends of marriage laid down in the
beginning by God Himself in the words 'Increase and multiply,' is beyond
the power of any human law." Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical, Rerumn. Novarum,
15 May, 1891.
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nothing to prevent a later marriage between the parties by mutual con-
sent. So what was a void marriage in the first instance (not the nebu-
lous voidable one) becomes, as of the date of consent, a valid one. Many
states have outlawed the common law marriage, and are content to term
this later marriage a ratification of the legally prescribed ceremony. If
the state wishes to use this devious method, there is apparently no
reason why it should not, since the proper end is attained.
The third and last condition essential to a valid marriage is the ab-
sence of any diriment impediment. In general, those impediments im-
posed by the civil law are previous marriage not dissolved, consanguin-
ity, affinity, miscegenation, and certain conditions of health and physi-
cal limitations. The first three may be disposed of quickly. Whatever
may be the prevailing American view as to the propriety of taking on
a succession of spouses, the law is quite clear that this is a monogamous
country-that only one wife orone husband at a time will be toleratedY7
While a person has a spouse living, therefore, he is absolutely pro-
hibited t on contracting a second m'-iriage. As far as this goes it is
correct and in accord with the natural law and scriptural authority.
Both Church and State have the authority to prohibit marriages
within certain degrees of consanguinity (blood relationship) or affinity
(the relationship of a person to the blood relations of his spouse). The
,atural law forbids only one such marriage-that of consanguinity in
he first degree of the direct line. All other prohibited degrees are
,ased on positive law. And, although every man has a natural right
to marry, he does not have a natural right to marry any particular per-
son where the common good is thereby endangered. Both health and
morality affect the common good, and, since both are inherent in con-
sanguineous and affinitive marriages, the regulating agencies of Church
and State may morally impose such limits as they deem desirable or
necessary to'promote the better health and morality of the community.
Vernier 2 states that all 51 American jurisdictions have statutes prohib-
iting certain consanguineous marriages, and that there is a surprising
degree of uniformity in these laws. However, 26 states do not make
affinity an impediment to. marriage.2
A less valid impediment imposed by many states is that of disparity
of race. At the present time 29 states prohibit the intermarriage of
27 For an interesting case discussing the right of an individual to practice
polygamy on religious grounds, see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25
L. Ed. 244 (1878).
28 Op. Cit., pp. 173-174.
29 The jurisdictions without statutes on this subject are: Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Utah, Washing-
ton, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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whites and Negroes, and 14 states prohibit such marriages between
whites and Mongolians. In at least two cases the applicable statutes
have been held constitutional."0 The Supreme Court of California, how-
ever, with three dissents has found the California statute unconstitu-
tional.3 1 The invalidity of this impediment does not rest on constitu-
tional grounds, however, but upon moral grounds. The argument begins
with our basic premise: that all men have a natural right to marry. If
this be so, then the regulartory power of the state is confined to pro-
hibiting only those marriages which impair the common good for
reasons of health or morality. It was at one time believed by many in
this country that a mixture of races would result in inferior beings.
This myth, conceived in ignorance and suckled by bigotry, has long
since been exploded.3 2 Indeed, very often the genes of two races supple-
ment each other to great advantage, producing brilliant and talented
men. It must be conceded that physical disharmonies, such as big hands
with small arms, sometimes appear. But it could hardly be said that this
affects the health of the individual in any manner. Similarly, morality
is in no way determined or affected by interracial marriages. The mis-
cegenation statutes have, therefore, no basis in reason, and are, at the
very least, unjust. Their only reason for existence lies in the bigotry of
some of our lawmakers, and this seems small justification for denying
to man rights which have been granted to him by God.
The last of the impediments imposed by the states are those based
on physical impairment. First and foremost of these is impotence.
Father Edwin Healy explains why impotence is a valid bar to marriage
when he says:
"The essence of matrimony consists in this, that each party
confers upon and receives from the other the perpetual and ex-
clusive use of the body in relation to the marital act. One who is
impotent, therefore, could not satisfy the conditions of this con-
tract, and so the natural law makes marriage for him impossi-
b le. 31
But every case of impotence is not a bar to marriage, for the marital
act is not an inherent impossibility where impotence is only a temporary
condition. And it is only this inherent impossibility that raises the bar.
Further, if the condition occurs after marriage, it cannot nullify what
was, at its inception, a valid marriage. We say, then, that for the im-
pediment of impotence to render a marriage of no force, it must be both
30 Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877) ; Blake v. Sessions, 99 Okia. 59, 220 P. 876
(1923).
31 Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. (2d) 711, 198 P. (2d) 17 (1948).
32 For a brief but thorough discrediting of the most popular misconceptions
concerning race, see Ruth Benedict and Gene Weltfish, The Races of Man-
kind, New York, Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 1943.
"3 Edwin F. Healy, S.J., Marriage Guidance, 1942, p. 201.
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permanent and antecedent to the marriage. 34 In some states impotence
is held to be grounds for divorce rather than for annulment.35
Sterility, unlike impotence, is not an impediment to matrimony,
since it does not frustrate the marital act. The jursidictions seem uni-
form in holding that, in the absence of fraud by concealment, it does
not constitute grounds for annulment.
As to other diseases and afflictions, the law is not quite so uniform.
Accordling to Vernier:
"Only three states, North Carolina, North Dakota, and
Washington, prohibit the marriage of persons having tubercu-
losis 'in the infectious stages' (North Carolina), or 'in its ad-
vanced stages' (North Dakota and Washington). In three other
states the statutes are of broader application. Delaware prohibits
the marriage of a party who has any 'communicable diseases the
nature of which is unknown to the other party'; Indiana pro-
hibits the marriage of any persons who is 'afflicted with a trans-
missible disease'; and in Pennsylvania there is, indirectly, such a
prohibition in the form of a requirement that upon application
for a license the parties must declare that they do not have any
transmissible disease." 36
Also in the case of epilepsy, some states regard the marriage of epi-
leptics as void,37 some as voidable, 35 while others regard them as valid,
?roviding the element of fraud does not enter in, even in the face of
prohibitory statutes. 39
It is perhaps reasonable to speculate that the reason for the great
diversity in the laws concerning contagious diseases and epilepsy is that
they do not rest on any firm ground in reason. Surely such persons are
capable of giving free consent to the marriage contract, and surely they
are capable of consummating the marriage. If the other party to the
marriage knows of and consents to marriage with a person so afflicted,
such would seem to be a valid marriage under the natural law. If the
other party does not know, the marriage, while sinful to the diseased
person, is yet valid. But what of the authority of the state to impose
impediments for reason of health? It will be remembered that when we
spoke of this previously, we stated that while the state may prohibit the
34Accord: Devanbagh v. Devanbagh, 5 Paige (N.Y.) 554, 28 Am. Dec. 443
(1836).
35 See, for example, Mass. Gen. Laws (1932), c. 208, sec. 1.
361 Vernier, American Family Laws (1931), p. 199. See North Carolina Ann.
Code (1935), sec. 2500a; North Dakota Comp. Laws (1913), secs. 4373-4378;
Washington Rev. Stat. (Remington, 1932), sec. 8439.
37In re Canon's Estate, 221 Wis. 322, 266 N.W. 918 (1936). Section 245.03(1)
of the Wisconsin Statutes (1949) provides ". . . No insane, imbecile, feeble-
minded or epileptic person or idiot shall be capable of contracting marriage."
"Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 61 A. 604, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 531 (1905).
39 Behsman v. Behsman, 144 Minn. 95, 174 N.W. 611, 7 A.L.R. 1501 (1919). Sec-
tion 517.03 of the Minnesota Statutes (1945) provides that, "No marriage
shall be contracted . . . between persons either one of whom is epileptic. .. ."
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marriage of a person to some particular person for reasons of health,
it was not within the power of the state to forbid marriage absolutely
to a man not otherwise incapacitated by the natural law. But when the
state forbids a tubercular or an epileptic to contract marriage, it is for-
bidding him absolutely. Thus the state is exceeding the power which it
morally possesses.
The scope of this article has been to survey the general grounds for
annulment. Some grounds we have found to be invalid as opposed to
the natural law. Some we have found valid, but abused. And in others
we have seen a correct application of the annulment proceedings. Much
could be said that we have not said.. Indeed, volumes could be written
on our every paragraph. But we are limited in space and scope herein.
Therefore, to contain our thoughts within the narrow bounds of this
paper, we have had to assume many premises, and have baldly stated
others without proof. Basic to our argument is the premise that mar-
riage is of divine institution, which, when validly contracted, is indis-
soluble except by death. We have further postulated that there is a
natural law to which the state, as well as all men individually, is sub-
ject; and finally that it is in the interest of the state to preserve the
marriage bond contracted by its citizens.
If, therefore, this article seems an oversimplification of the law, we
ascribe it to two reasons: first, we did not attempt to prove our every
statement, for this would be folly in so little space, and such proof is
readily available to any who seek it; and second, the law itself has be-
come unnecessarily confused. This is a day when words-no longer
mean the same thing when used by different people-as witness the use
of the word "democracy" by the United States and its totally different
use by Russia. Marriage was once considered a permanent union of
one man and one woman for the purpose of procreation and mutual
love and affection. A declaration of annulment once meant that the
parties separating were never validly married by reason of some pro-
hibiting defect existing at the time of the attempted marriage. It would
be far better, we think, were the country to "retrogress" to this position
once more. The current craze of swinging from spouse to spouse, as a
monkey swings from tree to tree, is destroying the very roots of our
existence-the God-fearing, God-loving family.
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